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CAMBODIA IN 2008
Consolidation in the Midst of Crisis
Caroline Hughes
Abstract
The Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) consolidated legislative control with a 
decisive election victory in 2008. Four contributing factors are identifi  ed: CPP 
control of local authorities who can deliver the vote, its marginalization of the 
opposition, the mass patronage enabled by an economic boom, and exploita-
tion of a border dispute with Thailand.
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The year 2008 saw a dramatic consolidation of con-
trol over Cambodia’s national legislature by the Cambodian People’s Party 
(CPP) as a result of its landslide victory in national elections. The victory 
refl  ected four converging factors: the CPP’s expanding control over the 
administrative apparatus of governance; its successful marginalization of 
the political opposition; the economic boom over which it has presided; 
and the deteriorating relationship with a crisis-ridden Thailand that, as in 
the last election year of 2003, gave the government a nationalist boost just 
in time for the election.
The CPP won 58% of the popular vote in the July 2008 election, but 
Cambodia’s proportional representation system based upon multi-member 
provincial constituencies gives a signifi  cant advantage to the largest par-
ties, awarding the CPP 90 out of 123 National Assembly seats. This was 
an increase from 73 in the last parliamentary term. New rules on the for-
mation of governments meant that for the fi  rst time since the passage of CAMBODIA IN 2008 207
the 1993 Constitution, the party had the mandate to form a government 
alone, without the need to entice opposition parties into coalition. In 2003, 
horse-trading over coalition building delayed the formation of a govern-
ment for almost 12 months following the elections; in 1998, the delay was 
six months. In 2008, a short-lived attempt by opposition parties to boycott 
Parliament soon collapsed in the face of the CPP’s strength. The CPP 
swiftly formed a government with the support of the two elected deputies 
from the Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendent, Neutre 
Pacifi  que et Coopé  ratif, better known as FUNCINPEC. The National 
Assembly presidency, the heads of the nine National Assembly commit-
tees, and all ministerial positions now belong to the CPP, for the fi  rst time 
since 1993.
Political Consolidation
Consolidation of control over the legislature both complements and re-
fl  ects the CPP’s long-standing strategy of monopolization of the adminis-
trative apparatus. Over the past few years, this strategy has been elaborated 
through a grand program of decentralization and deconcentration of power, 
which has had far-reaching effects, almost uniformly benefi  cial to the rul-
ing party. The fi  rst step of this strategy was the institution of elections for 
commune chiefs and councils, held in 2002 and 2007. In both elections, 
the CPP, as the largest and best-organized party, prevailed; it currently 
holds power in all but 30 of Cambodia’s 1,621 commune-level authorities. 
In 2006, these commune councils appointed or reappointed Cambodia’s 
13,000 village chiefs in a new system that cements the party’s dominance 
to the lowest levels of administration.
This control of local administration awards two electoral advantages to 
the CPP. First, it ensures that CPP loyalists are in charge of voter registra-
tion, prompting accusations by opposition parties this year that the pro-
cess is highly politicized and that up to a million opposition party voters 
have been disenfranchised. Second, although village and commune coun-
cillors are formally prohibited from campaigning for political parties “dur-
ing working hours,” in practice election observers in successive Cambodian 
elections have documented the active role played by local authorities in 
campaigning and turning out the CPP vote. These activities are coordi-
nated by the CPP’s network of district party offi  ces, and overseen by a se-
nior party member—a minister or secretary of state—assigned to the 
district. This system has proved highly effective in ensuring the conversion 
of mass patronage and administrative control into votes. Election observ-
ers this year noted that although elections in 2008 were better organized 
and freer than previous elections, open political campaigning on behalf of 208  ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLIX, NO. 1, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2009
the CPP by members of the executive branch, the armed forces, and local 
authorities had greatly increased.
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The next phase of the decentralization and deconcentration strategy 
looks set to replicate this political control at the district and provincial 
levels, which lie between the national and local layers of government. A 
new law was passed in April providing for the creation of a new provincial 
and district government system, in which “indirectly elected” councils will 
oversee the work of appointed governors in development planning and 
service delivery at these levels. An as-yet-undetermined array of functions 
currently carried out by national ministries will be “deconcentrated” to 
these levels, and this should give them substantial control of resources and 
services. Currently serving commune councillors, rather than the population 
as a whole, will comprise the electorate for provincial and district council 
members, via a process of proportional representation on the basis of 
party lists. The CPP’s huge majority at the commune council level ensures 
that it will sweep the boards in district and provincial council elections, 
scheduled for 2009; in turn, dominance at national, provincial, district, 
and village level should ensure victory in the next round of commune elec-
tions in 2012. The decentralized system has created a revolving cycle of 
national and subnational elections that mesh like gears to award exponen-
tially increased advantages to the incumbent.
At the same time, heavy-handed action against the opposition parties 
midway through the last electoral cycle has neutered the challenge of the 
political opposition. In the face of aggressive defamation lawsuits that 
carry a penalty of imprisonment, and the conviction of key individuals from 
the media, political parties, and trade unions, both the FUNCINPEC and 
Sam Rainsy Parties in early 2006 were coerced into supporting a motion 
to lower the bar for forming a government from a two-thirds to a simple 
majority vote in Parliament. Following this surrender of bargaining power, 
the ideologically incoherent royalist movement split into two troubled par-
ties that garnered only four seats between them in this year’s election, 
down from the 26 achieved by a united FUNCINPEC in 2003. The Sam 
Rainsy Party, with its clearer agenda and strong urban constituency, did 
better than previously, with 26 seats as opposed to 24 in 2003, and the new 
Human Rights Party, which joined the Sam Rainsy Party in the boycott, 
won three; however, these add up to little real leverage in a CPP-dominated 
Parliament and executive. For these reasons, a CPP victory carried a sense 
1. The Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia (COMFREL) (2008), 2008 
National Assembly Elections, Final Assessment and Report (Phnom Penh: COMFREL), online 
at <http://www.comfrel.org/images/others/12250728892008%20NAE%20Report.pdf>, p. 8.CAMBODIA IN 2008 209
of the inevitable this year; perhaps in part as a result of this, there were 
fewer incidents of violence and intimidation, and voter turnout declined 
from 83% in 2003 to 75% this year.
Economic Growth: Boom or Crisis?
Ostensibly, the CPP had much to boast about in its political campaigning. 
Until the global fi  nancial crisis began to take its toll in September 2008, 
Cambodia’s stunning rate of economic growth had continued. In the mid-
dle of the year, Minister of Economics and Finance Keat Chhon’s esti-
mate of 11% annual growth since 2005 was widely cited, and the impact of 
this growth was observable. In Phnom Penh, dramatic new skyscrapers are 
under construction, along with vast housing developments and shopping 
malls. The traffi  c at rush hour is regularly gridlocked as the new wealth 
spawned by increases in land values fi  nds its way into Toyota and Lexus 
salesrooms. The rapid expansion of the private banking sector and the 
level of domestic bank deposits fueled the spending spree as private credit 
growth surged, peaking at 103%, year on year, in June 2008.
2
Cambodian government fi  gures released in 2007 suggested that the rate 
of investment approvals had increased tenfold, from $270 million in 2000 
to $2.63 billion in 2006. The proportion of the total that represents Cam-
bodian, as opposed to foreign, investment has doubled over the same pe-
riod.
3 Actual foreign direct investment reached an estimated $750 million 
in 2008, led by China, South Korea, and Thailand but coming also from 
Russia and the United States.
4 The fastest-growing sectors were agricul-
ture and mining, although less was heard about the prospects of oil reve-
nues this year, prompting speculation that recent exploration has yielded 
disappointing results.
The benefi  ts of this economic frenzy did not reach everyone. What ap-
peared as a bonanza for rich tycoons and for the moderately landed middle 
class took the form of increased vulnerability and desperately high food 
prices for the poor. Infl  ation rose to 26% in the fi  rst half of 2008, fueled by 
oil prices, the rice crisis, and rising domestic demand. Before the new har-
vest began in November, rice prices peaked at 50% higher than at the start 
2.  International Monetary Fund (IMF), Statement at the Conclusion of the 2008 Article IV 
Discussions with Cambodia, November 7, 2008, press release (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 2008), 
online at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2008/pr08277.htm>.
3. Ibid., Cambodia – Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 
2007), online at <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07291.pdf>, p. 66.
4.  Associated Press, “IMF Says Cambodian Growth to Slow in 2009,” International Her-
ald Tribune, November 7, 2008, online at <http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/11/07/business/
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of the year,
5 bringing hardship for the two-thirds majority of rural Cam-
bodians who are net rice purchasers, and for urban workers, with a knock-
on effect on urban-rural remittances.
6
Equally, the rising price of land in the fi  rst half of the year entailed the 
continuation of violent incidents of land-grabbing and eviction, in Phnom 
Penh and across Cambodia. The rate of incidents slowed in the fi  rst half 
of 2008 as compared to 2007, in view of the impending election. But the 
pattern of landholding concentration in the hands of wealthy foreign in-
vestors partnered with well-connected Cambodians continues: high-profi  le 
forced evictions that occurred in Phnom Penh, Kampot, Koh Kong, and 
Ratanakiri refl  ected a pattern of lower-profi  le violent expropriation across 
the country. Many of these evictions concerned land designated by the 
central government for agro-industrial or construction developments, over 
the protests of villagers who live on or farm the land but without secure 
title. The statistics give a picture of the inequalities in access to land that 
are emerging, in part as a result of this development policy. It is currently 
estimated that one-fi  fth of rural families are landless and one-quarter lack 
suffi  cient land for subsistence, and that this rate is rising. One in four Cam-
bodian families are believed to have been involved in a land dispute at 
some time. About one-quarter of landowners own 70% of Cambodian 
land, while the poorest 40% of landowners crowd onto just 10%. Seven 
percent of the land area of Cambodia is in the hands of a single company, 
Pheapimex.
7
Given these different effects of growth, the economy is perhaps not the 
best explanation for the CPP’s electoral success. However, increasingly 
elaborate mechanisms for ploughing a proportion of the immense profi  ts 
reaped by tycoons and entrepreneurs, both inside and outside the gov-
ernment, back into the electoral machine certainly have an impact. The 
increasingly institutionalized system of merits and honors awarded to sabo-
raschon (meritorious benefactors of public works) operates through the 
party system to co-opt the vulnerable and marginalized into an intricate 
complex of economic and political control. Continued failure to put the 
5.  Vong Sokheng and Brendan Brady, “Feast or Famine for Rice Farmers?” Phnom Penh 
Post, September 11, 2008, online at <http://www.phnompenhpost.com/index.php/20080911 
21634/National-news/Feast-or-famine-for-rice-farmers.html>.
6.  Christopher Shay, “High Food Prices Failing to Benefi  t Farmers: Experts,” ibid., Octo-
ber 3, 2008, online at <http://www.phnompenhpost.com/index.php/2008100321952/Business/
High-food-prices-failing-to-benefi  t-farmers-experts.html>; Sam Rith, “As Prices Rise, Work-
ers Go Foraging,” ibid., October 22, 2008, online at <http://www.phnompenhpost.com/index.
php/2008102222246/National-news/As-prices-rise-workers-go-foraging.html>.
7. Land  Coalition,  Landlessness and Land Confl  icts in Cambodia (Phnom Penh: Star Kam-
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elected commune councils on a sound economic footing by awarding them 
a signifi  cant discretionary budget or revenue-raising powers, renders local 
government reliant upon party fi  nancing for the bulk of their develop-
ment funding, and entails that villagers increasingly cannot afford to vote 
against the CPP.
Since the election, the global economic crisis has started to take its toll 
on Cambodia’s economy. The IMF announced in November 2008 that it 
expected growth overall for the year to be about 6.5%, slowing to 4.8% in 
2009, with levels of foreign investment dropping by 25%–30%.
8 Garment 
exports to the U.S. were down only slightly over the fi  rst nine months of 
the year, but the perennially gloomy Garment Manufacturers’ Association 
of Cambodia claimed in December 2008 that export orders for the coming 
season had dropped 70% compared to 2007.
9 For now, the benefi  cial ef-
fects of lower infl  ation arguably outweigh the negative effects of the slow-
down in growth, although this could change dramatically next year: if 
employment opportunities contract sharply, the effects of increased land-
lessness will become disastrously clear. Tourism has also suffered, not only 
because of global effects but also because of the instability in neighboring 
Thailand, which spawned military confl  ict on the border in October 2008 
and the occupation of Bangkok’s international airport—a popular launch 
pad for tourists visiting Angkor Wat—in December.
The Preah Vihear Standoff: Crisis or 
Opportunity?
The political crisis in Thailand reverberated in Cambodia in a manner 
not wholly unwelcome to the ruling party. At the start of the year, Cam-
bodia put forward a bid to the United Nations Educational, Scientifi  c, 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to list the 11th-century temple of 
Preah Vihear on the Thai-Cambodian border as having World Heritage 
Status. This was granted in early July, during the election campaign period, 
prompting dancing in the streets in Phnom Penh and a mass government-
sponsored celebration broadcast across Cambodia on the state media. The 
exploitation of Cambodia’s archaeological heritage in the pursuit of short-
term nationalist popularity is a familiar part of the political repertoire for 
Cambodian governments. This year, however, the tactic ran headlong into 
Thai attempts to do the same thing at the same time and for the same rea-
son, with the same temple.
8.  Associated Press, “IMF Says Cambodian Growth to Slow in 2009.”
9. Fibre2fashion Newsdesk, “Garment Industry Needs to Improve Quality – GMAC,” 
Fibre2fashion, December 1, 2008, online at <http://www.fi  bre2fashion.com/news/apparel-news/
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Cambodian and Thai nationalists have long disputed ownership of the 
Preah Vihear temple; the issue is usually considered to have been resolved 
in Cambodia’s favor by a decision of the International Court of Justice at 
the Hague in 1962. Initially, the Thai government cooperated with the 
Cambodian government on the 2008 bid for World Heritage Status. But 
this policy was derailed in June, when the opposition People’s Alliance for 
Democracy (PAD), seeking to score nationalist points, reiterated Thai 
claims to the temple and denounced Bangkok’s support for Cambodia’s 
bid as a violation of Thai sovereignty. A judgement by the pro-PAD Thai 
courts that the Thai government had behaved unconstitutionally soon fol-
lowed. A delegation of protesters was detained by Cambodian authorities 
while attempting to plant the Thai fl  ag on the temple, and Thai troops 
were sent, ostensibly to police the demonstrators. But their deployment on 
disputed territory represented an insult to Cambodian sentiments. In an 
election year, the Cambodian government was constrained to respond with 
a deployment of its own, and as the nationalist rhetoric mounted on both 
sides, the situation became extremely tense.
Little actual fi  ghting eventuated; while both sides saw an interest in 
saber-rattling, outright war would have jeopardized signifi  cant economic 
investments on both sides of the border. The tensions were, from the CPP’s 
perspective, fortunately timed to coincide with election campaigning: as 
the only party with any serious claims to military prowess, the CPP bene-
fi  ted vis-à-vis other parties at home. The affair also played into the hands of 
the Cambodian military elite, which has taken the opportunity to launch a 
conscription campaign, to claim land on the border to build new soldiers’ 
villages (a sound investment considering ongoing strategies of subregional 
integration), and to lobby successfully for a larger share of the 2009 bud-
get. Since a brief fi  re fi  ght in October 2008, with elections safely over and 
the Thai government’s capacity to respond deteriorating, the Cambodian 
government has taken a lower profi  le on the Preah Vihear issue, appar-
ently recognizing that there is little prospect of resolving the dispute amid 
the current chaos. The key concern from the Cambodian government’s 
perspective in the post-election period is to avoid pressing the issue in a 
manner that could retard the process of economic cooperation between 
the Thai and Cambodian economic elites, which have invested heavily in 
casinos and special economic zones on the border.Reproducedwithpermissionofthecopyrightowner.Furtherreproductionprohibitedwithoutpermission.